The negotiations to produce a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC) have been followed carefully by a num-
ber of scholars and activists in different countries despite the apparent
lack of interest among scientists, the general public and the mass media.
Amy Smithson probably reflected a view held by many such activists and
scholars when she suggested that: ‘Strengthening the BWC is unques-
tionably necessary to enhance international security, but this treaty is
orders of magnitude more difficult to monitor than nuclear, chemical, or
conventional arms control accords … ’. ¹ However, it is important to
understand that the task is not considered impossible by those who have
looked very carefully at the problem. Stephen Black, for example, reflect-
ing on the difficult task UNSCOM had in Iraq, concluded:

Some have suggested that the goal of designing a BW verification
mechanism, which can detect noncompliance, is unattainable. The
Special Commission has proven that it is not impossible to detect a
concealed BW program, even when it is carefully hidden. While it
took several years and significant effort, UNSCOM was able to build
a case that could have only one outcome – Iraq's admission of an
offensive BW program … ²

What is of particular interest is Black's later comment that:

UNSCOM showed the value of a systems approach to biological arms
verification, rather than looking for single elements and discrete
actions. … It was the combination and obvious direction of Iraq's
dual-use capabilities that convinced the world of Iraq's deceit.

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