involuntary and significant presage of the defeat and death of
Mardonius at Plataea.

The ample powers committed to Mardonius might reason-
ably make him confident, of ultimate success in the enter-
prise of which, in the face of ardent opposition, he had
originally been the chief adviser. He was allowed to retain
all the best troops, consisting for the most part of Persians
and Medes in equal numbers--the latter, however, of inferior
account; he retained all the Sakae, Bactrians, and Indians,
both horse and foot, and picked men from all the other tribes,
including Aethiopians and Egyptians whom he had with-
drawn at Phalerum from the fighting armament of the Phoe-
nician ¹ galleys. The Persian Immortals all remained with
him, though their commander Hydarnes declined to quit the
King. Of the retained army as many as 60,000 men were
to be detached to accompany Xerxes until he was safe in Asia,
and then rejoin. This important body was under command
of Artabazus son of Pharnaces, previously named as a leader
of the Parthians and Chorasmians, who would fain have made
the withdrawal from Southern Hellas definitive and total, and
was now submitting only perforce and most reluctantly to
the superior influence of Mardonius. The later consequences
of this disagreement, combined with his military influence,
which would of necessity be confirmed by so important an
independent command, were momentous.

The resumption of operations southwards was necessarily
deferred until the ensuing spring; by that time the troops
that conducted Xerxes could return, and Thessaly meanwhile,
where the Aleuad Thorax of Larissa was still zealous for the
expedition that he had done so much to invite, and the,
nearer district of ² Macedonia, afforded undisturbed winter
quarters, and the best opportunity of providing subsistence
for a renewed campaign.

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