Lester H. Brune

The cold war in Asia differed significantly from that in Europe. Although
the rhetoric of American leaders often overlooked or blurred these dif-
ferences, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United
States in Europe differed from the start in 1945 because Germany surren-
dered in May while the Japanese held out until August. Furthermore,
nothing in Europe matched the Chinese renewal of its civil war following
the evacuation of Japanese troops, nor did Europe experience the anti-
colonial upsurge that Asian nationalists precipitated after 1945. Finally,
the Korean War brought direct conflict between U.S. and communist
forces, a situation avoided in Europe throughout the cold war. As Akira Iriye
explains in "Was There a Cold War in Asia?" ( 1977) the gap between
American policy perceptions of Asian circumstances and European con-
ditions not only adversely influenced U.S. policy in Asia but is essential
for understanding Asian developments.

Generally the literature about U.S. policy in Asia and Korea did not
reflect Asia's differences from Europe until the Sino-Soviet conflict be-
came apparent due to the Chinese-Soviet border conflicts of the late
1960s. In addition, the release of classified U.S. documents on the period
from 1945 to 1950 clarified that the two communist powers never oper-
ated as a Soviet monolith against Washington and its allies. After 1970,
therefore, historical literature on Asia shows two important differences
between Asia and Europe. First, U.S. policy before and after World War
II assumed that Europe was the most vital interest of the United States,
with Asia and the Pacific having a secondary role, at best. The lesser role
assigned to Asia by U.S. policymakers was a corollary of the fact that un-
derdeveloped colonial areas were less critical than industrialized regions,
a perception that led Washington usually to ignore the opposition of Asian
nationalists to colonialism. Second, U.S. plans for postwar Asia became

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