ship by the station. In this case Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker and Stewart dissented. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY After the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in the Cruikshank case 1 held unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to punish private citizens for depriving Negroes of the right to assemble freely. It declared that nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment jus- tified Congressional action against individuals. It held that the right to assemble freely, although mentioned in the First Amendment, was inherent not in national but in state citizenship, except where the assembly was for the purpose of petitioning Congress. In deJonge v. Oregon 2 the Court, in 1937, placed the right of assembly within the concept of due process, thus protecting it against state interference. In that case a conviction under the Oregon criminal syndicalism law for assisting at a meeting called under the auspices of the Communist Party was set aside since the state had not charged that any illegal doctrine had been pronounced at the meeting. On the other hand a state may punish participation in an assembly if it is called for the purpose of engaging in violent action. 5 The Hague case 3 held that it was improper to bar all meetings on streets and in parks, but the Court recognized the right to "regulate" the use of streets and parks "in the interest of all." In Cox v. New Hampshire 4 the Court unanimously held that a statute requiring a license for the holding of a parade interfered neither with free speech nor with freedom of religion. Chief Justice Hughes said: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the ex- istence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excess of unrestrained abuses."
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