It is a great question whether you can save the manufac-
turers -- the independent manufacturers -- of the higher
product or not from absolute trust domination. But you
ought to try, it. -- H. E. Miles, testimony in tariff hear-
ings before the House Ways and Means Committee, De-
cember 1908

The revisionists had assured that a new tariff would be at the head of the
congressional agenda of 1908-9, much as earlier revision impulses had
placed the tariff on the agendas of the postelection Congresses of 1896-97
and 1900-1901. But unlike the reciprocity coalitions of the McKinley era,
the movement of the Taft period had a more specific ideology, greater
organization, and a more elaborate policy agenda. Working with the presi-
dent-elect, revisionists sought to confront congressional logrolling and to
create, in what would become the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, a more
effective infrastructure for expansionism. In addition, as all tariff makers
recognized, the new tariff law would codify the evolving political-economic
relations of domestic producers. Thus, as revisionists pressed for lower
tariff rates, a maximum-minimum duty structure, and a tariff commission,
they redefined their stance toward the rising corporate system.

President-elect William H. Taft knew that the tariff would be the first
crucial issue of his presidency. Although upholding protection in his cam-
paign against William Jennings Bryan, Taft had described tariff revision as
not only expedient but necessary. In part, Taft was answering Democratic
calls for revision. But Taft also pursued revision because of his global
experiences -- in Asia and as overseer of the Panama Canal effort -- and

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