August-September, 1917

Lawrence's persuasion secures the transfer of Feisal's forces to Aqaba, for operations in
the north as Allenby's mobile wing--Liquid funds--The Turkish threat to Aqaba is
paralysed by pricks--Lawrence begins to operate against the railway

LAWRENCE'S first definite proposal towards the new campaign was
that Wejh should be abandoned, and Feisal's whole force transferred
to Aqaba. When the authorities in Cairo hesitated before this bold
suggestion, Lawrence increased its boldness, urging the withdrawal
from the Yanbo-Medina area of all the stores and money that were
being used to sustain the operations of Ali and Abdulla. While Feisal
was at Aqaba far up the flank of the Hejaz railway, and Allenby was
before Gaza threatening an advance into Palestine, the Turks were
not likely to strengthen the garrison of Medina. The important
thing was to prevent them weakening it, and trying to withdraw
their forces northward. A little encouragement, through a further
slackening of effort in the south, might aid this purpose without in-
volving any serious danger to the Arabs in the Hejaz.

Here, however, Lawrence was donning the mantle of Robertson
and pressing a military theory beyond the limits of political ex-
pediency. But the stiffening of opposition to this further suggestion
brought with it a relaxation of caution towards his first. Thus Law-
rence's political instinct was justified, and he promptly exploited the
weakening.

Aqaba was only 130 miles from the British position at the Wadi
Ghazze, whereas it was 700 miles from Mecca. He suggested that,
as a logical consequence, Feisal's force should be transferred from
Hussein's sphere of control to Allenby's and become an autonomous
army with Feisal its commander, under Allenby's supreme com-
mand. Their future lines of operation ran in the same direction.

Before this proposal could be adopted, three potential human
obstacles had to be overcome--Feisal, Wingate, and Hussein. Law-

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