July-August, 1918

Allenby's plan of attack--The need for distraction--A call to Lawrence--A preliminary
diversion by the Imperial Camel Corps: Buxton's raid--Lawrence's self-analysis--
A "bully beef tin" bluff--Internal complications threaten the Arab plan, but the
march to the north begins

ON JULY 11th Lawrence and Dawnay were again at General Head-
quarters, where they were told the outline of Allenby's plan. At that
moment the British Government had received no hint of his inten-
tions, so careful was he to cloak them until his staff had worked out
calculations that promised their realization.

Lawrence's experience of British staff calculations had made him
healthily critical of them, so that he "took the precaution to go into
their offices and assure myself of the exact methods on which they
were working." His anxiety was diminished when he found that the
chief of the General Staff was on leave, as well as the chief of the "Q"
staff, and that in their absence Bartholomew and Evans, their now
unfettered right hands, were working out the material factors of the
problem, and, better still, were planning to redistribute the transport
of the army corps in a way that suited the varying mobility of their
roles instead of a stereotyped pattern. Thus the momentum of the
advance might be sustained and the pursuit extended. Instead of be-
ing tied to a fixed-length chain of supply, the fighting troops of the
army were now to be given comparative freedom of movement by
the use of an elastic cord that could not only be stretched but quickly
attached to fresh points. There was also the definite intention of liv-
ing on the country except for troops' rations during movement.

The plan of operations was based on a reversal of the Gaza-
Beersheba plan. Instead of threatening an advance near the coast to
cloak the real stroke inland, every possible ruse was to be employed
to suggest an inland move, from the Jordan valley, while the break-
through was made in the coastal corridor. The mass of the infantry

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