these campaigns constituted true turning points, but each of the campaigns
treated in this series contributed to shaping the course of the conflict, open-
ing opportunities, and eliminating alternatives.

Series co-editor Anne J. Bailey examination of William T. Sherman
march from Atlanta to Savannah and John Bell Hood's invasion of Tennes-
see in the fall of 1864 reminds us of the close relationship between these two
campaigns. For though the fall of Atlanta may have brightened Abraham Lincoln's
prospects for reelection, it presented both commanders with trou-
blesome challenges. Frustrated in his attempts to cut Sherman off from his
lines of supply and communication, Hood decided to strike northward; at
the same time, Sherman, realizing that Atlanta had become something of an
albatross, chose to move south. His target was not an army but the hearts
and souls of Confederate supporters and the logistical infrastructure of the
Confederate heartland. That he succeeded is evident in the stories that per-
sist to this day of the terror and destruction surrounding the March to the
Sea. Yet as even Sherman realized, the Union triumph would be far from
complete unless Hood's Army of Tennessee was put out of action. Thwarted
from intercepting retreating Union forces at Spring Hill, Hood threw his
men at the Yankee defenses at Franklin, incurring tremendous losses. It was
left to George H. Thomas to deliver a death blow to what remained of
Hood's army south of Nashville but only after delays and bad weather nearly
cost him his command at the hands of an impatient Ulysses S. Grant.

By January 1865 Grant and Sherman could turn to Virginia and the Car-
olinas and prepare to crush the core of Confederate resistance east of the
Mississippi. In retrospect, the result might seem preordained, but Bailey
reminds us of the importance of contingency and command decisions in
shaping the result.

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