annually; in 1988, the won appreciated against the yen by 17.3 percent. In 1989 when Korea's current account surplus declined, the won appreciated slightly against the dollar and continued to appreciate against the yen. On balance between the end of 1985 and 1989, the won appreciated against the dollar 31 percent in nominal terms and about 38 percent in real terms; against the yen, the won depreciated about 6 percent in nominal terms and appreciated about 8 percent in real terms. 34 Capital controls were adjusted to encourage outward flow and reduce the inward flow of capital. Perhaps the most important change in capital flows was the prepayment of external debt. Prepayments totalled $16 billion or 27 percent of exports of goods and services in 1986-89. 35 To reinforce this effort, in 1986, the terms of foreign borrowing and domestic foreign-currency borrowing were tightened. In 1987 and 1988, controls on the use of foreign exchange for tourism and remittances were eased. 36 In 1987-89, approval procedures for overseas direct investments were simplified and tax benefits for inward direct investment were reduced. In addition, approved Korean firms were allowed to purchase foreign real estate and securities and retain more foreign exchange earnings overseas. Trade liberalization also contributed to monetary and price stability. Trade liberalization often targeted scarce products to help reduce domestic prices. Tariff reductions or less binding quotas had the immediate effect of reducing the price of imported goods, as well as the intermediate effect of reducing the trade surplus, the source of monetary expansion and therefore of inflationary pressure in the first place. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS The Korean government took many steps to relieve the potential inflationary consequences of the large balance of payments surplus that developed in the second half of the 1980s. As a short-run response, the government greatly expanded its use of reserve asset management to help sterilize its foreign exchange intervention. As a longer-term solution, the government made changes in its exchange rate policy, capital controls, and trade policy to reduce the balance of payments surplus. The measures included steps toward liberalizing Korea's domestic interest rates, system of allocating domestic credit, and exchange rate and capital control systems. However, some of the measures to offset the balance of payments surplus involved additional tightening of existing controls (primarily on capital inflows). In addition, while these steps were extensive, they were not entirely effective, as evidenced by the subsequent acceleration of consumer price and asset price inflation. Unfortunately, it appears that many of these steps toward liberalization were taken to meet more limited objectives--like reducing the inflationary impact of the balance of payments surplus 37 --rather than as a comprehen- -134- |