even the most solid of arrangements. Given the fluid political and economic
condition of Russian society, Russian democracy could be the victim at any
time of a military coup or an anti-Western government, coming into power
by ballot or by force. The centrifugal currents operating in the old Soviet
empire have not run dry, and the potential for more conflicts between Mos-
cow and the former Soviet republics remains alive in 1995. NATO's pres-
ence, even in an attenuated military form, is an insurance against a new
anti-Western campaign on the part of inflamed Russian nationalists.

Even if Russia becomes comfortable with NATO next door and accepts
a supportive treaty with the Western Allies, security in Europe does not
automatically follow. The rising militancy of Islam not only might topple
secular Arab regimes but could affect the northern as well as the southern
littoral of the Mediterranean. France and Italy may be affected. And it is
not beyond the realm of possibility that Greece and Turkey, both members
of NATO, might fall out in an even more dangerous fashion than they did
over Cyprus in 1974.

But there is another centripetal force undergirding NATO in the mid-
1990s and that is the role of a powerful united Germany. While German
democracy is as assured as that of any of its neighbours, its very size creates
problems. Its dominant role in the European Union is one fact for slowing
the unification of Europe. In this context the American component of
NATO is a counterbalance to the authority of Germany in the alliance.
The allies rarely publicize this issue, but the allies in NATO remember the
"pledge" of 1949, and show no signs of wishing to remove this link. The
downsizing of American and European forces in the alliance is not accom-
panied by demands for the expulsion of American troops. Nor is there any
sign that any member intends to exercise its right to remove itself from the
treaty under Article 13.

If the American connection remains important for Europe today, does it
follow that the European entanglement is still in America's national inter-
est? While there are voices in the United States which from time to time
speak out about the Pacific region replacing the Atlantic, or about the high
cost of the Atlantic burden, the consensus of both political parties is that
a return to isolationism, even if possible, would be self-destructive. The
American stake in European stability is as vital today as it was during the
Cold War. The mechanisms within the Alliance may change. It is not un-
reasonable to assume greater European responsibility in the future, possible
symbolized by a European SACEUR, as some American commentators
have observed over the past generation. But such changes need not involve
an abandonment of Europe. Breaking entangling ties with Europe now
would threaten what historian John Lewis Gaddis has called "the long

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