The institutional theory has thus far been a poor explanatory model. Of
the empirical propositions drawn from Chubb and Moe's reasoning,
those dealing with demand, democratic control, bureaucracy, and com-
petition (propositions 1, 2, 4, and 5 in Table 3.1, p. 42 ) have failed to
meet school choice advocates' expectations. While the coun-
terhypotheses suggested by school choice critics are not joined in a
cohesive structure such as the institutional theory, they have so far
proved to be the more robust explanatory platform.

Still, the school choice cargo carried by the institutional theory has
not yet been lost. Two of the six empirical propositions--those dealing
with institutional variation and reform--have not been directly ad-
dressed. The argument that the public school system has uniform, mo-
nopolistic traits and is incapable of promoting effective reform is an
important and so far relatively untouched bulkhead of support for the
institutional theory. While the vessel may have foundered on the em-
pirical shoals, it remains afloat. The purpose of this chapter is to test
empirically the hypotheses dealing with reform.

Chubb and Moe argue that the existing education system is incapable
of making effective reforms. As evidence they point to the response of
the system to a series of critical reports on the state of education
(especially National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983).
The response to these analyses was not to ignore, but enthusiastically
to pursue efforts to correct the perceived problems. Chubb and Moe
( 1990, 10) say that in the 1980s, "the pace of change was frenetic.
State after state adopted some permutation of a laundry list of reforms
that, in the course of public study and debate, had come to be associ-

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