The year 1996 was a lesson in political reality for the Republican
Congress and particularly for the Republican freshmen in the House.
Unprepared for defeat in the budget battle and the counterattack from
the left, they appeared dispirited and disoriented in the early months of
1996, as Bill Clinton came roaring back to popularity thanks to the
government shutdown and a strong economy. This was an outcome
that neither the militant freshmen nor the party leadership had fore-
seen, believing that their commitment to political reform and a bal-
anced budget would outweigh all other considerations with the voters.
In addition to these problems, the freshmen found themselves saddled
with a wounded and profoundly unpopular House Speaker; a weak
presidential candidate, about whom few freshmen could muster much
enthusiasm; and a $35 million national advertising campaign directed
specifically against them by organized labor.

The freshmen realized by the early summer of 1996 that in this
situation it was now every man for himself in a battle for electoral
survival, and they fell back on the more traditional freshman member's
role of constituent ombudsman and service provider. The defection of
dozens of freshmen on the minimum-wage issue was the first major
sign that they were going to strike out on their own regardless of the
cost to the party's ideological priorities, and while a determined minor-
ity continued to remonstrate with the leadership over budgetary com-
promises, most freshmen got their heads down and tried to lower their
Washington profile and raise their district profile.

The replacement of Dole as Senate leader by the more energetic and
pragmatic Trent Lott provided the opportunity for the Republican con-
gressional leadership to make a fresh start on a more compromise-ori-
ented approach toward the White House and Senate Democrats that
yielded major benefits in terms of legislative accomplishment and demon-
strated the efficacy of a much-maligned Congress. The passage of the gift
and lobby reforms also demonstrated that despite their inability to address
the campaign finance reform issue, the Republicans had accomplished
significant and popular political changes in the institutional workings of
Congress. The resort to pragmatism in 1996 had been an electoral neces-
sity for the congressional Republicans, but as the final chapter
demonstrates, their reforming zeal of 1995 had still left a significant
impact on Washington and American national politics.

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