jective criterion beyond the conception which "right
reasoning" or "the good man" might form for him-
self of happiness as the end of life. The practical
question in Ethic however is, as already shown, whe-
ther there is or is not such a subjective practical
criterion.

4. If we turn to history proper we find a corre-
sponding fact. Neither in Greece nor in Rome was
there a spiritual power, in the usual sense of the
term, side by side with or above the temporal, as
Auguste Comte has shown. The development of the
mind of man had not reached that stage at which
the subjective side of practical judgment could make
itself manifest, either in the shape of a theoretical
philosophy or in that of a political constitution. It
is only dawning in the Aristotelian doctrine of πζοαί-
ζεσις. It is however the most prominent feature in
the writings of St. Paul, the point on which he most
earnestly insists: "Let every man be fully persuaded
in his own mind" ( Rom. xiv. 5); and "Whatsoever
is not of faith is sin" ( Rom. xiv. 23). St. Paul is
the law reformer of rising Christianity, as the writers
of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Fourth
Gospel and First Epistle of St. John are its religious
philosophers, or reformers in theology proper. He
substituted the law of Conscience for the law of ordi-
nances, the status of grace, of faith, of sonship, for
the status of servitude to an external authority; free
grace and free obedience being two expressions for
one and the same thing, namely, the relation between
the subject and the sovereign, between man and
God. The doctrine of a conscience which could not
be bound by temporal laws was the specific shape in
which the subjective aspect of choice made its im-

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