argument does not rest only upon the fact that the
representation of an atom is formed by imagination
from the presentation of visible and tangible objects,
but also on the circumstance that both presentation
and representation can be analysed into the same
logically separable elements.

7. Metaphysic, then, digs down deeper into phe-
nomena than physical science does; deeper in one
direction at least; for the method of physical science
which analyses phenomena into minute empirical
portions, atoms and their movements, is deep in
another sense or direction, not entered on at all by
metaphysic. If however the physicist could show,
either that the ultimate elements of the physical
sciences, atoms and their movements, were not far-
ther distinguishable into metaphysical elements, logic-
ally but not empirically separable from each other;
or that the ultimate elements of metaphysic, feelings,
time, and space, were empirical or complete objects,
such as are the ultimate elements of physic;--then,
in either case, the logical priority of metaphysic to
physic, in dealing with phenomena from the subjec-
tive side, would have to be abandoned. But to show
that atoms cannot be conceived without force, nor
force without atoms, is merely to show that the
metaphysical conception, of elements only logically
separable from each other, has a wider application
than merely to the phenomena of metaphysic, namely,
to physical science itself; for it would be showing
the ultimate elements of physic to be still more
complex than they have been here supposed to be.
Again it is often said that the conception of pure
force, or force as a cause of motion, is subjective,
but that motion, the effect, is objective. The latter

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