distinctions mentioned which is directly and at first
applicable; the distinction of form and matter applies
to every state of consciousness alike, and consequently
it could only be the greater or less degree of either
of these elements in any given case which could cause
it to be classed under one or the other category;
but such a greater or less degree, or predominance,
of either element can only be judged of when the
states themselves have been already ranged in some
classification, and distinguished although roughly
from each other. Again, the distinction between re-
flective and direct modes of consciousness is in itself
subordinate to the distinction between presentation
and representation, since reflection is one mode of
the latter; this distinction, then, will be found to
be the basis of a classification of the feelings falling
under representation, that is, of the emotions, but
not of the feelings as a whole. If however we turn
to the other class of distinctions, distinctions in the
matter of feeling itself, it will be seen that the dif-
ferences between special feelings are indeed imme-
diately discernible, but, from their being the last
specialities, τὰ ϰαθ̓ ἕϰαστα, of experience, are rather
the matter to be classed than the ground of classifi-
cation; since it is the very difficulty of distinguishing
these specialities of feeling which causes us to under-
take the task of analysis and classification. As to
the remaining distinction, between general or per-
vading feelings, pleasure, pain, and effort, and special
feelings pervaded by them, it is true that this dis-
tinction is broad and sound and obvious; but it
neither leads us to anything further than itself, nor
becomes the ground of further distinctions to be de-
veloped out of it. As the distinction between form

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