show the cause or origin of the specific character of
feeling involved in these emotions, any more than of
those of joy and sorrow from which he derives them,
or any more, it may be said, than of the sense of
effort itself. What he has really done is to charac-
terise the emotions in terms of second intention, in
terms expressing their relation to successful or un-
successful effort, when such effort for a purpose is
really felt. For that there is pleasure and pain at-
tached to such success and unsuccess is a fact of
experience, and a distinct relation between the two
is observable as a phenomenon of consciousness. It
will be seen, when the emotions are analysed in this
and the following Chapter, that they have, besides
their specific character, another and a general cha-
racter of pleasure or pain, derived from or consisting
in this success or unsuccess in attaining the purpose
aimed at. I do not propose to follow Spinoza farther
in his deduction of the emotions; a complete exami-
nation of his system is not to be done as a bywork;
and I have discussed it only so far as it opposed an
obstacle to the analysis of the emotions as pheno-
mena, by appearing to be an exhaustive explanation
of them. It will now, I think, be evident that his
deduction can at the most be only partially true; and
that to attain a more complete truth it is requisite
to undertake the analysis of the emotions for them-
selves, as phenomena or states of consciousness, with-
out attempting to deduce them from a single principle
a priori. This analysis, which will also be a classi-
fication, it now remains to take in hand.

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