of effort for a purpose, or volition; 7th, the distinc-
tion between cases where emotions differ in general
kind from each other and cases where one emotion
differs from another only in circumstantials, and the
difference is of variety from species, or species from
genus, as for instance in avarice, where the exces-
sive fondness for different kinds of objects gives but
varieties of excessive fondness for possessions gene-
ally; 8th, the distinction between the two great
modes of representation, direct and reflective; and,
within each of these, that between representation
which is pure remembrance and representation which
is imagination; and 9th, the distinction between the
different degrees of complexity, in the emotions and
their frameworks at once, which distinction will be
the guiding thread of the analysis of the emotions,
as it was before in that of the sensations.

2. Casting a glance back over these distinctions
and referring to the remarks made in § 8, it becomes
clear that the distinction between the direct and re-
flective modes of representation is the most general
of all, breaking up the whole group of emotions into
two sub-groups, each of which contains within it all
the other distinctions, and thus forming the main
fundamental division of the subject. In the next
place, each of these sub-groups is similarly divisible
into two, by the distinction between representation
which is pure remembrance and representation which
is imagination; and each of the sub-groups so formed
again contains within it all the remaining distinc-
tions. After this we come to minor distinctions
which can only be exhibited by applying the canon
of 'greater or less complexity to the emotions in de-
tail. The four sub-groups which are thus laid at

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