the appetite which lies at the basis of that emotion.
The instances however in which those traits are very
weak approach on that account closely to friendship,
and make a kind of debateable ground between them.
Friendship can exist everywhere where eros can, but
it cannot, generally speaking, be carried up to the
same intensity, not because it lacks the element of
appetite, but because persons of the opposite sexes
are the only persons between whom rivalry can be
entirely abolished. This annihilation of rivalry is
a circumstance common to the love between persons
of opposite sex with only one other kind of love or
personal relation, namely, with love to God, or re-
ligion, the object of which is an Ideal, as will appear
in its place. But wherever the feeling of rivalry
can be diminished, there and in that proportion will
the love or friendship between different persons be
purer and closer; and in these cases friendship
proper, or affection between persons of the same sex,
will be capable of very great intensity. Such cases
will arise between teacher and pupil, patron and
client, and generally between older and younger
persons; between equals chiefly when their careers
are different. Alliances between individuals and
between bodies of men are often the beginning of
friendship, but they are not friendship itself; there
is originally no affection, but the alliance is made
for some extraneous purpose; these are cases of
Aristotle's φιλία founded on the χξήσιμον. Alliances
of every kind, such as between buyer and seller, and
makers of any contract, and between citizens of the
same state, or between two states, have their own
kind or mode of emotion, sympathetic but in the
lowest degree; the emotion is some kind or other

-199-