of goodwill, and in these forms too it is the first step
to friendship or love.

§ 26. Before completing this group by the exa-
mination of the subordinate or allied emotions, it
will be well to turn to the antipathetic group. The
direct emotion of aversion becomes, when its object
is a person, personal dislike or ill will, the opposite of
goodwill or benevolence. When this dislike is repre-
sented as reciprocated, the emotion is hate, which of
course admits of many degrees, among which we
may distinguish, perhaps, bitterness and malice, al-
though we usually employ the word only for great de-
grees of it. Founded on a small or transient degree
of hate is anger, which is hate of any action prompted
by dislike. It arises when the mind attributes to an-
other a feeling of dislike which has led it to do some-
thing towards the destruction or injury of the object
of its dislike. Attributing such an act from such a
motive to any person, the mind feels anger towards
that person on account of its act; hence anger can
be appeased by renouncing or expressing sorrow for
the act; not so dislike itself. Revenge is indurated,
that is, prolonged and cherished anger. Ill will, bit-
terness, hate, malice, anger, revenge,--these are the
antipathetic emotions which are the opposites of good-
will, love, friendship, and to those subordinates or
derivatives of them which are now to be mentioned.
Malice seems to stand to the antipathetic emotions as
affection stands to the sympathetic. Malice and af-
fection are perhaps the most purely emotional terms
in the language, indicating an emotional element
with least suggestion of a framework. The readi-
ness of disposition to affection or to malice which
makes these emotions seem to prompt the imagina-

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