fills the mind and eclipses all other considerations;
in the second case, a vivid sense of hope and a dis-
position to see the bright side of things; in the third
case, an inaccessibility to fear which leaves the ad-
venturous spirit uncontrolled.

6. Now if we were to assume that the mind was
composed of, or could be analysed into, faculties, such
as are the cognitive, the conative, and the faculty of
feeling, then, assuming the conative faculty to be one
of these, courage might, perhaps rightly, be consi-
dered as a sub-faculty or mode of the faculty of cona-
tion. But it has been shown already that such a
view is untenable, since activity is never found pure,
but is always coloured by some feeling or by some
object, by which alone it can be defined. The dis-
tinction of faculties therefore being abandoned, no
ground remains for considering the term courage as
making a separate group of emotions, passions, or
actions, irreducible into others more elementary. The
phenomena to which the name is given must be dis-
tributed under the heads of other emotions, acts, or
objects. And following the distinctions already made,
the phenomena of courage may be properly divided
into such as are directed against physical dangers or
difficulties, forces of nature, and impersonal circum-
stances, and those directed against persons and the
opposition which they may offer. It is courage against
persons which we have to do with here, the other
kind of courage finding its place under the direct emo-
tions of hope and fear; and the antipathetic emotions
are those of which the acts and feelings of courage
against persons are modifications, and between which
they form the transitions; for in every case where
we resist the will of another person, or assert our-

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