not injustice because the pleasureable quality of the
new image and emotion has imposed names on them
of its own, obliterated the fact of incongruity, and
withdrawn them from the category of evil. Free
gift, free grace, bounty, magnanimity, return of good
for evil, undeserved favour, such are the names of
the incongruity that replaces an old image by a
better than was expected. The shock of falsified
expectation no longer sets the two persons at vari-
ance but unites them, there is no balance to be
struck, no measurement to be made; the surprised
person accepts the other's view of the matter at once;
and thus this kind of falsified expectation, so far from
being injustice, is a more abundant justice, for the
contrast between the two persons' views of the same
matter is destroyed as soon as revealed, and by the
same circumstance which revealed it. This class
of cases therefore furnishes no argument against the
view of justice and injustice here taken; but the
definition of injustice must in consequence of it be
restricted to embrace only cases of expectation de-
ceived for the worse, or injuries that are unlooked
for. It is no doubt this character which has led so
many writers to lay harm at the basis of injustice,
and benefit at the basis of justice; upon which as
the genus they then seek to import the differentia
which makes harm unjust, and benefit just. The
reverse in my opinion is the true method; contrast
between two persons' views of the same matter, whe-
ther disclosed by words or by action, the shock of
deceived expectation, is the generic notion, and the
qualities of the feelings involved supply the differ-
entia. Upon this basis, as the first disturbance of
equality or harmony, is built the gradual return to

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