The Anti-Comintern Pact. The motivation behind the negotiations
with Germany in 1938-1939 was the desire to conclude an open alliance
against Russia to replace the secret alliance as contained in the Anti-
Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936.

The Anti-Comintern Pact consisted of three short articles which were
published, and a supplementary protocol which amounted to a secret
alliance against the Soviet Union. The published part of the pact spoke
in ideological terms, recognizing that "the aim of the Communist Inter-
national . . . is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the
means at its command," and therefore, the contracting powers had
agreed to "inform one another of the activities of the Communist
International, to consult with one another on necessary preventive
measures, and to carry these through in close collaboration."

The first of the three articles in the secret addendum provided that
should either of the signatories become the object of an unprovoked
attack or threat of attack by the U. S. S. R., the other would do nothing
to aid Russia. The second article pledged that during the duration of
the pact both parties would "conclude no political treaties contrary to
the spirit of this agreement without mutual consent."

On procedural matters, the pact also established a new precedent.
It was negotiated by the Bureau Ribbentrop and the Japanese Army
High Command, rather than through the respective foreign ministries.
Foreign Ministers of both countries were hardly informed of the de-
velopment of the actual negotiations. Japanese Military Attaché in
Berlin General Hiroshi Oshima pointed out that the content of the
pact, especially the supplemental understanding, was in the nature of
military consideration, and thus it was he, not the Ambassador, who
was responsible for the conclusion of the pact. The Military Attaché
reported directly to the Chief of General Staff and was not subordin-
ated to the Ambassador.

By 1938 the secret alliance was no longer adequate. Japan was
deeply involved in the China theater, and the prospect of a protracted
war magnified the threat from the North. An open alliance with
Germany against Russia seemed to the Army High Command to be

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