Earlier in this book I discussed Locke's argument that shows that
secondary qualities cannot be real or occurrent qualities of bodies.
We cannot reasonably suppose that colors are real qualities of
bodies, because they play no active causal role in the scientific
theories about nature that we use to explain the course of human
experience. But we also had reason to reject Locke's alternative
theory, the pure power analysis. In addition we were unable to find
any reasons for accepting the main rivals to Locke's positive ac-
count. Neither the idea that colors are microstates of bodies nor the
claim that they are actually exemplified constituents of conscious-
ness was able to survive criticism. Each of the rejected accounts
has the same basic flaw; each characterizes color in a way that fails
to capture its true nature. Each must deny our common under-
standing of the sort of quality color is. In its account of color, each
changes the subject.

We are now apparently at an impasse. For if colors are neither
pure powers nor microstates nor features of consciousness, what

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