THE crusading zeal with which George approached the
realm of philosophy is nowhere better illustrated than in his
attack upon what he considered the apostasy of Herbert
Spencer. Here in Spencer's change of opinion on the land
question was a deliberate attempt, George felt, to com-
promise with a truth that had been recognized and accepted,
and, in almost the spirit of a holy war, he brought all his
controversial powers and all the keenness of his logic to bear
against this great figure in English thought. The attack upon
Spencer included not only an analysis of his views on the
land question, but extended also to the vast structure of the
synthetic philosophy, and to the philosopher's personal
character. It may seem somewhat strange, this furious on-
slaught upon an ideational process, and even a little un-
warranted and in bad taste, but it must be remembered that
the nineteenth century took its polemics, as it did everything
else, a bit more seriously than is the custom at present. And
it must also be remembered that this attack of George -- it
was not a controversy since Spencer never directly answered
it -- was not something merely contentious. It was based
rather on what, for George, was the most vital of human
efforts, that of holding fast to truth, after it had been ob-
tained, and repelling every attempt made against it. The
great truth was to be found in the solution of the land prob-
lem and in the implications that it suggested, and when once
that had been grasped, as George felt Spencer had grasped
it, and then abandoned for the flimsiest of motives, such re-

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