purposes from the larger matrix of actual conscious experi-
ence of which they form a part. But as a matter of fact
when our sense organs are stimulated, we are commonly con-
scious of objects rather than of mere qualities. The con-
sciousness of objects, or 'thinghood' is technically called
perception and will be studied in the next chapter.

James has hit off the point, in one of his happy inspira-
tions, saying that sensation gives us mere "acquaintance
with objects," whereas perception gives us "knowledge about"
them. As a matter of fact, it is clear that our sensory experi-
ences which involve simply becoming acquainted with objects
are few and far between. The all but universal reaction
is one in which we place, or classify, or recognise, the stimu-
lus in some way, thus relating it vitally to our past knowl-
edge. A literally pure sensation would only be possible as a
first experience prior to all other experience. On the other
hand any sensation may be regarded as elementary which
cannot be further analysed. It should be added, too, that the
assignment of objective character to our sense experiences is
especially prompt and convincing in those senses which most
definitely contribute to our awareness of extension, resist-
ance, and externality to the organism, i. e., touch and vision.

Despite their abstract and unreal character when taken
in isolation, sensations furnish us the basic material upon
which our world of knowledge rests. We clothe them with
meaning and with associations of innumerable sorts, and in
the perceptual and ideational forms, which we shall encounter
in our further study, we employ them as the foundation for
all our thinking.

From both the psychological and physiological sides there-
fore, sensory processes are fundamental.

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