12 THE FOURTH WAY It is a sound rule of academic prudence to admit one's ignorance promptly when one's chances of disguising it are slight. Thus I had better begin this chapter by saying that I don't think I understand the Fourth Way, and have even less confidence in my ability to make it out as an argument that proves the existence of God. I console myself by the consideration that I am in good company: both Kenny and Geach seem to give up on the Fourth Way. 1 But since a book with a title or sub-title like Four out of the Five Ways in the Context of St Thomas's Theory of Science would have attracted yet fewer readers than one sub-titled (as I intended) The Five Ways of St Thomas in the Context of his Theory of Science I shall make bold to offer the reader some considerations about the Fourth Way, in the hope that the Advertising Standards Authority will thus be encouraged to treat my publishers leniently. We might as well begin with the text: no previous explanation, I think, will make it any easier. The fourth way is taken from the degrees which are found in things. In things we find that some things are more or less good, or true, or noble, and other such things. But 'more' and 'less' so-and-so are said of various things in so far as they approach, in their different ways, that which is most so-and-so, as that which is hotter is that which is closest to that which is hottest. There is, then, something which is most true, and best, and most noble, and which therefore most exists: for those things which are most true are most existent, as it says in the second book of the Metaphysics. That which is said to be greatest in any kind causes everything of that kind, as for example fire, which is the hottest thing, is the cause of all hot things, as it says in the same book.
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