from normative ethics. But it is at least doubtful whether an
empirical study of morals is the only form of ethics which is not
normative. Many philosophers would deny this. They would
maintain that there is a philosophical study of moral concepts and
judgments, which is distinct both from normative ethics and from
the empirical study of moral phenomena. For this type of study of
morals the term meta-ethies has recently become fashionable.

On the further question of the nature of meta-ethics opinions
are not settled. Some would call meta-ethics a conceptual or logical
study of morals. And some would wish to add that a conceptual
study of morals is essentially a logical study of the language of
morals. Meta-ethics -- this seems to be agreed -- does not aim at
telling what things are good and bad and what are our moral duties.
It aims at a better understanding of what 'good' and 'bad' and
'duty' mean.

All these characterizations are loaded with problems. They do
not suffice by themselves for drawing a sharp boundary either
between meta-ethics and normative ethics or between meta-ethics
and empirical investigation.

The idea of a sharp separation of normative ethics and meta-
ethics seems to me to rest on an oversimplified and superficial
view of the first and on an insufficient understanding of the
nature of the second. The view of normative ethics as (some sort
of) moral legislation, perhaps in combination with a criticism of
current moral standards, is one-sided. So is the view of normative
ethics as casuistry. 'Normative ethics' is not a suitable name for any
one thing. Those, who use the name, tend to heap under it a number
of different philosophic and moralistic activities. One of these
activities, thus classified as 'normative', I would myself call
conceptual investigation; and I would not know how to distinguish
it sharply from the allegedly non-normative conceptual analysis
belonging to meta-ethics.

Anyone who thinks that a sharp distinction can be maintained
between meta-ethics and normative ethics is invited to consider
the nature of such works as Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Kant
Grundlegung Zur Metaphjsik der Sitten, or John Stuart Mill Utilita-
rianism. Is their contents meta-ethics or normative ethics? Some, I
think, would answer that the works mentioned contain elements
of both types of ethics and perhaps deplore that their authors did
not distinguish more sharply between the two. My own inclination

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