the true meaning of the terms fixed. Till that is done the
terms, used at random, are worse than useless. In these
four Dialogues (I shall return to the Apology which heads
the group) Plato seems to be concerned to bring out a
shortcoming of some sort in the method of ἐπαλτιλοὶ λόγοι
and τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου practised by Socrates. These
are all what Grote called 'Dialogues of Search'--we come
away from them feeling that popular opinion and popular
language in respect of the virtues discussed are, indeed,
hopelessly confused, and that exact definitions are impera-
tively needed if good conduct is to be achieved and a
theory or science of conduct pari passu evolved; at the
same time we feel that the difficulty of finding such defini-
tions is immense, and that hardly any way has been made
towards their discovery.

The Apology is a fit prelude to these four Dialogues of
Search unsuccessful search so far as positive results are
concerned with its burden 'nobody knows what Virtue
is--but Socrates alone knows that he does not know what
it is' ( Apol. 22, 23). He cannot teach it, and has never
professed to teach it; nor has he ever found any one who
can teach it among those who profess to do so. The
Athenians show how far they are from knowing what
Virtue is--and unless a man knows what Virtue is he
cannot be virtuous--by their pursuit of honour and reputa-
tion without heed for knowledge and truth and the soul's
welfare ( Apol. 29 E). Here the thought is: Virtue is
knowledge, or cannot exist without knowledge; but this
knowledge cannot be acquired and communicated. It is
not the man who pleases himself, the man who follows the
fashion of the day in pursuing the objects of social and
political ambition and is successful in the pursuit, who is
'virtuous': it is the man who is led, not by personal
feeling through life, but by reflective thought, who is really
virtuous'--'Virtue is knowledge: but it cannot be taught.'

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