the judicial policy-making process in action, some illustrative of
the continuity of constitutional policy, others perspectives from
which changes in that policy may be viewed, as fate and the values
represented on the Court determine. In both situations, I hope the
material will add to the understanding of how constitutional
policy is made.

In preparing this text, I have received generous assistance
from several of the attorneys who were engaged in the litigation I
have explored. I especially thank Richard Sobol for his help in
regard to Duncan v. Louisiana; Keith Monroe for his generous
responses to my questions on Chimel v. California; Professor
Melville Nimmer of the UCLA Law School for his comments on
Cohen v. California; and Joseph Levin, Jr., of the Southern
Poverty Law Center for his assistance in regard to the litigation in
Frontiero v. Richardson.

I express my appreciation also to C. Lansing Hays of the
Mayfield Publishing Company for initially encouraging me to
author a text of this kind and for his continuing words of support.
Zipporah Collins has been tolerant in the extreme in editing a
manuscript typed on an old, beat-up Remington, and Carole
Norton has bolstered my courage in meeting the electronic age in
the form of an Olivetti electric.

None of the above individuals is of course responsible for any
sins of commission or omission in the text; on that point, the plea
must be the traditional one: mea culpa.

R.C.C.

Tucson
Spring 1975

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