Hitler, however, refused the second alternative because it involved the
surrender of the Donets basin and delayed the attack on Kursk, which would
give German industry more time to produce additional Tiger and Panther tanks.
The Germans did increase their tank strength significantly in April, May, and
June, but Hitler's decision to wait until more tanks were available also gave the
Soviets the opportunity to build tanks at a faster rate than the Germans. Given
the mechanical problems of the early production models of the Tiger and
Panther, the Germans lost ground in the comparable tank numbers by delaying
from April to July 1943. ³ Hitler's error was compounded when one compares
German intelligence estimates of Soviet tank production with the official figures
now available. German intelligence knew that they would lose, not gain, ground
with tank forces by delaying the battle. Weather had determined the earliest and
best time for the battle to take place, but the optimum date was sacrificed by
Hitler's concern for more Tigers and Panthers.

Another factor in Hitler's decision to delay was the desire to give German
divisions, worn down in previous battles, the opportunity to absorb replacements
and obtain new weapons. Again the problem was that the delay gave the
Russians time to make similar restorations and to rebuild their own worn units.
In addition, the Soviets had a larger population and a larger pool of incoming
recruits. About half of the annual class of new recruits trained in the spring and
were sent to the front in late spring and early summer. The other half were
trained in the fall. As a result the Red Army had enough men to both restore
worn divisions and to create new units, including self-propelled tank destroyer
regiments and tank destroyer brigades that would play a major role in the battle
at Kursk. In April 1943, Hitler had a strategic reserve provided by the divisions
from France that the Red Army could not match. However, in July, while the
German reserves had grown slightly, the Russians had an entire army group (the
Steppe Front) in reserve behind the Kursk salient. The Germans were not able
to make a significant increase in the number of units in the three-month interval,
although individual units had improved in quality.

According to Zhukov and others, Hitler's miscalculation was almost rescued
by a compensating misjudgment on the part of Stalin. Stalin argued that a
preemptive strike, similar to the disastrous attack at Izium in the spring of 1942,
would catch the Germans off guard and ward off the attack. Stalin's position
had considerable validity. By the time the roads dried in April, the Red Army
had recovered some of its strength and was far superior to the German forces
in manpower and tanks. Traditionally the numerically superior force usually
attacks the numerically inferior force. However, the level of Russian training
was low and engaging the experienced German divisions would have been a
risky ploy. Stalin deferred to his generals and waited for the German attack.

The final factor, the battle location, was dictated by the presence of the
bulge at Kursk that presented the Germans with an ideal opportunity to encircle
a large number of Russians with minimal effort. The Russians were faced with
strong German forces on the north, west, and south. A quick drive from both

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