secure. On the other hand, authorities are not lacking, especially
among the opponents of hedonistic ethics, to combat the doctrine
that the idea of a pleasurable end is of the essence of desire.

It seems to me that the difficulty here is due to a failure to
keep apart the desire proper and the mental states which usually,
but not necessarily, attach themselves to it. We have already
seen how this occurs with reference to desire and impulse.
The case here appears to me to be quite similar. ¹ The satis-
faction of desire is a pleasurable psychosis, as is all relief from
restrictive pain. That pleasure always results if the idea un-
realised in desire is realised in its satisfaction is a fact which is
soon recognised, and usually to the desire is quickly added the
pleasurable image of the pleasant resultant. Furthermore,
pleasurable ideas of pleasure to come are powerful stimuli to all
activities, and, when the resultant is restricted, are powerful
means of the production of desire; but it cannot be denied, I
think, that desires may occur for what is recognised to be indiffer-
ent, or even painful, beyond the pleasure of the mere action after
restriction. As Volkmann ² says, "We desire originally not
that of which we wish the enjoyment, but we cease to desire so
soon as we are satisfied; and desire knows well its own pain, but
not the pleasure which will arise if it is satisfied."

That the relation to resultant pleasure is not of the essence
of desire is, I think, clear from the fact pointed out by Dr. James
Ward ³ that the strength of desire is not proportional to the
intensity of the anticipated pleasure; furthermore, it seems to be
necessary, in order to defend the position, to uphold what seems
to me to be a false notion, viz. that the "representation" of a
pleasurable psychosis must itself always be a pleasure. ⁴

A pleasure in fact may, and often does, produce a pleasure in
"representation"; this pleasure tends to persist and to realise
itself, and when this realisation does not take place we have an
obstructive craving. There is not a corresponding action with
painful objects. To express it differently; usually the fact that
a thing is recognised as a pleasure in representation acts as

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