| | no outside trading partners, and maybe the Soviet Union could too. If both countries want to improve their living standards substantially, however, they should take advantage of their potential abilities to buy and sell products from each other. The Soviet Union is one of the leading grain buyers of the world and could be a leading buyer in almost any field, given the size of its population. The Soviet Union is one of the leading producers of oil and gold, and it could become a leading producer in other fields if it would concentrate its resources on what it can do relatively well, the way Japan has. The United States could sell grain and other products to the Soviet Union in return for gold, oil, and other products, thereby easing the international deficit, which can be paid in gold, and the U.S. energy problems. Everything that is shown in Table 17-6 can be subjected to a computerized what-if analysis. Such an analysis enables one to determine what it would take to bring any of those alternatives that are tied for second place up to first place. It also enables one to determine the effects of adding additional goals, changing the alternatives, or changing any of the inputs. This kind of what-if capability may be the most important purpose that is served by working with decision- aiding software. Some of the benefits can also be obtained by working with a spreadsheet matrix (like that of Table 17-6 with alternatives, goals, relations, and total scores) even if the matrix is not computerized. One type of sensitivity analysis that is often especially helpful is to ask what would be the winning alternative if we just concentrate on the conservative goals or give them extra weight, which in this case would be having a higher GNP with full employment and lots of consumer goods. One exciting characteristic of super-optimum so- lutions is that they win even when one uses only conservative weights or only liberal weights. The reason here and often in other SOS situations is that the SOS alternative does better than the other alternatives on every individual goal, not just better on the overall total. There are ways of systematically arriving at super-optimum solutions. That, however, is partly a subject for Chapter 19 on "Broadening the Applicability of Multi-Criteria Dispute Resolution" and for my next book on Super-Optimum Solutions in Public Controversies. NOTES | 1. | For further details on arms control in general, see Ralph Goldman, Arms Control and Peace Keeping: Feeling Safe in This World ( New York: Random House, 1982); Alva Myrdal , The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race ( New York: Pantheon, 1982); William Epstein and Bernard Feld, eds., New Di- rections in Disarmament ( New York: Praeger, 1981); and Michael May, George Bing, and John Steinbruner, Strategic Arms Reductions ( Washington, DC: Brookings Institu- tion, 1988). | | | | | 2. | For further details on international negotiation and mediation, see Roger Fisher, International Mediation: A Guide for Practitioners ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard Negotiation Project, 1980); Marie Dugan, ed., Conflict Resolution, special issue of Peace and Change, Summer 1982; American Law Institute, Remedies for Violations of International Law ( Philadelphia: ALI, 1984); and back issues of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. | | | | -210- | |