gerous in the Orient than to make oneself detested
without making oneself feared." ⁷³

If France had been able to carry out a definite policy
of reorganization in Morocco at this time, the Moroccan
question might have been settled once for all. The
Sultan, once installed in Rabat, turned to France to
help him against his brother; General Drude with
reinforcements and assisted by Spain, could have put
the whole coast region in order, while General Lyautey
was victoriously proceeding against the tribes trou-
bling the Algerian frontier. All Europe seemed will-
ing that France should put an end to the chaotic con-
dition, and Germany seemed to expect it. But once
more the internal condition of France interfered with
her foreign policy. From its very inception the
Clemenceau government had to cope with a number of
very serious strikes. The manifestations during the
summer of 1907 in various parts of the South, often
resulted in bloody clashes. Many of the regiments
stationed in the Midi mutinied, the entire administra-
tion of several towns resigned, and the government was
hard pressed to avert a civil war. Under these cir-
cumstances the government's foreign policy was bound
to suffer, and its policy in Morocco was vacillating in
the extreme. The Act of Algeciras had been pre-
scribed as the proper medicine for the Moroccan sick-
ness, therefore the Act must be applied. But as to the
means of application, no decision could be reached,
and the Moroccan question was destined to drag along
-- the bête noire of the French Foreign Office.

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