square miles in the Congo, and only after a war scare
that might well have developed into a death struggle.

Both the Chamber and the Senate passed the treaty
with very little discussion. The Moroccan question,
primarily one of colonial policy, had already for too
long a time thrust itself forward as the chief stumbling
block to the foreign policy of the Quai d'Orsay. After
paying Germany an extortionate price, after settling
with England at almost her own terms, after even con-
ceding to Italy a free hand in Tripoli as the price of
her withdrawal from the field, France could hardly
refuse to give a suitable compensation to Spain, who
both geographically and historically possessed the most
legitimate claims of all. Besides, the two nations still
had a difficult task before them; the Moroccan ques-
tion, within Morocco itself, was far from settled, and
a friendly cooperation was the only possible basis of
a successful solution. M. Pichon, once more Minister
of Foreign Affairs, happily described the situation
when the treaty came before the Senate, March 29,
1913: "the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations
have resulted in assuring the collaboration of two
governments and two peoples who have already had
so many reasons to come to an understanding, and who
have henceforth one reason more to unite for the daily
practice of a policy destined to guarantee upon the
African shore, the security, the well-being, and the
prosperity of an empire of the future in which they are
henceforth equally interested." ⁴⁷

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