To suggest the outcome as a failure is not to suggest what form interven-
tion should have taken, and is certainly bounded by the aura of the time.
Would the American public have accepted the use of U.S. forces for the
very limited (non-Clausewitzian) purpose of saving some civilian lives in
the wake of the highly Clausewitzian experience in Desert Storm, where the
military power of the state was harnessed to large and apparently lofty
purposes? Were we willing to contemplate the limited use of small amounts
of force for limited outcomes at that point in time--or today? Do we, in
fact, have a viable strategy today that would tell us the process and pros-
pects of engaging in state-building in a failed state? Are we destined to
continue to muddle through these situations? All these are questions raised
but not clearly answered by Operation Restore Hope.

The situations in Peru and Somalia are mirrors of the pattern of violence in
the post-Cold War world, which is why they were selected for treatment as
case studies. The narcoinsurgency being conducted by Sendero Luminoso
spans the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, but also demonstrates
the difference between the two periods. The SL insurgency was born in the
ideological cauldron of conununism and anticommunism and was sustained
in those terms for some time. The narcotics connection gradually intruded
into the purity of SL's activities and, especially after the capture of
Guzmin, came to dominate its raison d'être. Whether it can return to its
ideological roots and whether those ideas have appeal in a post-Cold War
Peru whose leadership is dedicated to drawing the country into the greater
economic prosperity of the global economy remains to be seen.

The situation in Somalia is more symptomatic of the new internal wars
of the post-Cold War world. Somalia's tragedy is that of the extremely
destitute state with few economic prospects and a history of inability to
govern itself in a stable manner--the profile of the failed state. Its failure in
1991 and 1992 was certainly not the first time the Somali people have faced
tragedy; the inability to remedy the political situation as late as 1997 sug-
gests that the problems could recur.

It is extremely easy to become disillusioned, even cynical, about the
kinds of problems encountered in these two cases, and more broadly in the
general discussion of internal war in the international environment. To sug-
gest that there is any widespread consensus on the problem or how it should
be handled would go beyond current reality. In the final chapter, however,
we will look at some ways in which to organize and decide what may be the
appropriate responses to those challenges.

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