must begin by recalling, at least in outline, the physical and
philosophical beliefs of his contemporaries and predecessors; for
it is to the particular difficulties which these encounter rather
than to what are vaguely called general philosophical problems
that the Critical Philosophy owes its origin and development.

This is perhaps obvious, and I may be accused of merely repeat-
ing what requires no confirmation. I submit, however, that even
if the importance of historical factors in determining Kant's
thought is commonly admitted, their practical effect on both the
method and teaching of the Critique itself is to a great extent
overlooked. For Kant's attitude towards contemporary thought,
and in particular contemporary science, is not a matter which con-
cerns only his general approach to and treatment of metaphysics.
The whole structure and detailed argument of the Transcendental
Analytic is to a great extent determined by it. I have therefore
two objects in view. The first is to help the student who is approach-
ing Kant for the first time to realize the actual questions in which
Kant was interested and the answers to them which the Critique
puts forward. This is the purpose of Parts I and II which will, I
hope, be intelligible to readers who have no previous acquaintance
with Kant's writings. Part III is more detailed and presupposes
familiarity with the text of the Critique of Pure Reason itself. It
does not establish completely my view of the scope and method
of the Analytic, but I believe that it does indicate a line of approach
which is likely to be profitable and which has received too little
attention hitherto.

One result of the addiction of Kant's fellow countrymen to
world wars has been that this book has taken as long to produce
as did the Critique of Pure Reason itself. This, unfortunately, is
the only respect in which the two works are comparable with one
another.

T. D. W.

OXFORD
1944

-vi-