It is possible to encapsulate all the several normative questions in the one central
question: 'What in general is a good reason for action by or with regard to states?'

Mervyn Frost, Ethics and International Relations, 1996 (p. 79)

We act rightly 'when the time comes' not out of strength of will but out of the quality
of our usual attachments and the kind of energy and discernment which we have
available. And to this the whole activity of our consciousness is relevant.

Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, 1997 (p. 357)

This book presents a critical analysis of both commonplace assumptions
and dominant modes of reasoning about ethics in international relations
and attempts to work towards a new understanding of the nature and
purposes of moral enquiry in the context of global social relations. I start
from the general assumption that ethics is not distinct from, but embed-
ded in, both the practices and the theories of international relations.
Moreover, I assume that those practices and theories are themselves mu-
tually constituting. 'Ethics' and 'international relations' cannot be re-
garded as the opposition of 'ought' and 'is'; the way that we live and or-
ganize ourselves can be understood only through reference to the
historically developed and evolving ideas and beliefs that we hold--
ideas and beliefs which have value and thus reflect our ideas about
morality.

These starting points might be regarded by many as counterintuitive.
Commonsense reasoning seems to tell us that ethics plays no part in the
ruthless business of international politics. Moreover, until recently, most
theorists of international relations have sought, not without some consid-
erable degree of success, to distance the discipline from moral considera-
tions and ethical reasoning through the development of increasingly
scientific theories and methodologies. In spite of this, however, the deve-
lopment of orthodox international relations theory has relied heavily on

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