Having analyzed the nature and extent of the overlap between folk psychology and
scientific psychology, I now turn to the even thornier question of what the relation
should be between folk psychology and scientific psychology. In terms of the
distinction drawn previously between Use ₁ and Use ₂, this second section of the
book deals principally with Use ₂ --the use of folk psychology in the development
of overarching psychological theories.

As previously noted, social psychologists, compared to cognitive scientists and
philosophers, have adopted different and largely independent tacks in analyzing
the scientific credibility of folk psychology. Within social psychology, a sustained
and substantial research program over the last few decades has sought to empiri-
cally test the rationality and accuracy of common modes of social thought. In
contrast, cognitive scientists and philosophers have concentrated on the scientific
utility of folk psychology from a highly abstract and theoretical perspective that
has focused on the usefulness of a handful of basic folk concepts such as attitudes
and beliefs.

Whatever focus one adopts, judgments of the rational or scientific status of
elements in folk psychology are inevitably normative judgments, based on com-
parisons between what ordinary folk do with some prescriptive scientific account.
I have already proffered an account of what folk psychology consists of. In this
section, I take up the other component of this comparison and outline what I take
to be a scientific approach to psychology that consists of a contemporary version
of scientific realism. As part of this account, I also analyze the merits and problems
of two alternatives to scientific realism: traditional empiricism and relativism.
Hopefully, this way of proceeding will make it clear why I hold to a version of
scientific realism, and also perhaps help correct what I believe are some widespread
misconceptions in psychology concerning scientific method.

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