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| | Index | | Accountability in oversight, 211 | | | Active and reactive monitoring of agency activities, 93 - 94, 96, 97 - 104, 188 ; advantages of active system, 100 - 101 ; costs of each system, 102 -03; ra- tionality of active system, 101 -02 | | | "Administrative presidency" strategy, 5, 27, 192 | | | Administrative sector: agency behavior, impact of oversight on, 195 -98; congressional committees, relations with, 5 - 7, 196 ; European bureaucra- cies, comparison with, 6 - 9 ; executive branch, relations with, 4 - 5, 7 ; liberal political culture and, 9 - 10 ; personnel system, 4 - 5 ; politicized nature, 5 - 6, 7, 8 - 9 ; power of, 1 - 2 ; separation of pow- ers and, 2 - 4. See also Agency execu- tives | | | Advocacy context of oversight, 118, 121, 158, 162, 199 ; advocacy and oversight motivations, relationship between, 172 -75; advocacy-opposition measure, staffers' attitudes toward, 163 -66; bias toward advocacy in committee sys- tem, 176, 182 -83; charter or purpose of agency, sympathy with, 167 -69; as common context for oversight, 162 -63, 169 ; comprehensive oversight and, 173 ; conclusions regarding, 182 -83; consequences of, 170 -75; constituency committees and, 170 -71; deregulation and, 164, 177 -79; dissatisfaction with program administration and, 168, 169 ; exceptions to, 177 -79; future of, 183 ; "immortality" of government organi- zations and, 177 ; members' support for programs, reasons for, 176 -77; neutral and strong advocates, compar- ative behaviors of, 171 -75; opposition as form of advocacy, 177 ; predomi- nance of advocacy, reasons for, 175 - 77; qualified advocacy, 164 ; in Reagan years, 179 -82; reforms aimed at, 203 - 05; specific oversight cases and, 171 - 72; successful oversight cases and, 166 -69, 174 -75; turnover in unit mem- bership and, 179 | | | "Advocate," definition of, 162 | | | Agency executives: congressional control of, through oversight, 121 ; demo- graphics of, 80 ; educational back- grounds, 81 ; guildlike system for ad- vancement, 81 - 82 ; staffs of committees, comparison with, 80 - 83 | | | Agenda for oversight, factors influenc- ing, 105, 194 ; administration of pro- grams, committee dissatisfaction with, 117 ; agency policies, disagreements with, 107 ; assisting favored programs and getting public credit for it, 117 - 19, 158 ; chamber differences, 1 - 14, 119 ; conclusions regarding, 120 -22; "duty" factors, 120, 151 -52; "electoral payoff" considerations, 111 -12, 117 -18, 189 ; "members' needs" factors, 119 -20; publicity potential of agenda items, 108, 118 -19; reauthorization process, 107 -08; relative importance of factors, 109 -14; research findings on, 106 -08; scandals and crises at agencies, 106 - 07, 120 ; structure of factors, 114 -20; | -283- | | |
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Publication Information: Book Title: Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Contributors: Joel D. Aberbach - author. Publisher: Brookings Institutuion. Place of Publication: Washington, DC. Publication Year: 1990. Page Number: 283.
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