THE plan for the coup d'état envisaged three phases: the assassina-
tion, action to be taken within the first few hours after it (the
state of military emergency), and the political and military reper-
cussions.

According to Schulenburg's evidence (KB 89) Beck, Olbricht and
Tresckow had expressly affirmed at their meetings that there must
be an attempt on Hitler because without his forcible removal the
plan "would involve too great a risk". Tresckow, who had dis-
cussed the need for a change in the preceding months with Stieff,
told him openly at the beginning of August 1943, possibly on the
6th, that he now felt it necessary to get rid of the Führer by
assassination. He thought the "enemy's war potential was over-
whelming" and said it was a matter of military commonsense to
consider the war as lost. It was, in fact, the historic duty of General
Staff officers, in the interests of the nation, to prevent defeat in the
Second World War, which was a certainty under the present
leadership" ( Stieff evidence, KB 88). According to Stieff, Tresckow
had added that "at the conferences which he had been told to
attend as GSO I of Army Group Centre, together with his Com-
mander-in-Chief, he had become convinced that an attempt on the
Führer was perfectly feasible during Hitler's situation conference".
We must assume that at that meeting with Tresckow or during
later discussions with Beck and Olbricht, Stieff declared himself
ready to plan the assassination with his group, and to carry it out
at one of Hitler's daily situation conferences which he had to
attend. According to another report ( Schulenburg, KB 89) Colonel
Meichssner, too, was approached in September, and told of the
preparations. He is said to have promised to get ready to make the
attempt. Being a member of the OKW's Army staff, he and his
Commander, Keitel, were expected as occasion demanded to put
in an appearance at the "noon situation" conference.

Tresckow used the same means as before to get his explosives:
via the Abwehr through Colonel von Freytag-Loringhoven. And in
September he once again obtained the necessary British-made
explosives and handed them over to Stauffenberg in October, when
he had to return to the front. From Stauffenberg they found their
way to Stieff.

From the start, no military force worth speaking of was available

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