This chapter moves on to an examination of the differention between legal and
political questions as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.),
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and in the judgments and
advisory opinions of the Court. As it was with the PCIJ, the possibility of the
Court speaking to this issue exists to a greater degree than for the arbitral
tribunal because of the much greater chance of a case being initiated unilaterally
under some form of compulsory jurisdiction. What results from the possibility
for unilateral application to the Court is a greater likelihood of jurisdictional
objections being raised by an unwilling respondent. Certainly, one of those
objections may be over the suitability of the subject matter for legal resolution.

The United Nations Charter charges the international community with the duty
to resolve its disputes peacefully in Article 2(3), which states, "All Members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." The "peaceful
means" that the U.N. has in mind are set forth in Chapter 6 of the Charter, that
chapter devoted to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Article 33(1) reads:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
concilliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.

One notes the inclusion of judicial settlement in this statement, which like the
Covenant of the League raises the specter of an international court. The
prevailing view in the mid-1940s of the role, and the limits to that role, that

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