GETTING OUT VS. GETTING THROUGH: U.S. AND U.N. POLICIES IN SOMALIA Ken Menkhaus Dr. Menkhaus is assistant professor of political science at Davidson College in North Carolina. From August 1993 to March 1994, he served in Somalia as a political advisor in the United Nations Operation in Somalia [ UNOSOM]. With the departure of the last American forces left in So- malia on March 26, 1994, a new phase in the United Na- tions Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) be- gins. Innumerable media analyses have em- phasized how much is at stake in the suc- cess or failure of the UNOSOM mission. For the United Nations, salvaging even limited accomplishments in Somalia is be- lieved to be imperative for protecting the future of multilateralism in the post-Cold War order and for safeguarding the U.N.'s role in "peace enforcement." For the Clinton administration, a successful con- clusion to the intervention in Somalia is important in order to avoid the embarrass- ment of being held responsible for renewed chaos in a country to which the American public devoted so many resources and lives. Finally, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has noted repeat- edly that Somalia itself risks renewed civil war and another cycle of famine should the U.N. mission be forced to withdraw before a viable Somali state is established. In reality, however, the international stakes in Somalia may no longer be that high. For the United Nations, the damage to its reputation in peace enforcement and to the notion of multilateral intervention has already been done. The imagery of failure, captured in the bruised face of captured pilot Michael Durant and tele- vised around the world, will never be sup- planted by any quiet successes the United Nations may extract from Somalia in the coming year. Indeed, the term "Somalia syndrome" has already come to describe international reluctance to intervene in Haiti and Burundi. This is not permanent damage -- for lack of alternatives, the inter- national community will continue to call on the United Nations to play an enhanced peace-keeping role in a world beset by ethnic conflict and collapsing states. But it has, for better or worse, slowed the mo- mentum of the United Nations in its activist role in peace enforcement. For the Clinton administration, once the last American forces withdraw at the end of March, media coverage of Somalia in the United States, which has driven much of American policy since mid-1992, will plum- met. Should UNOSOM collapse following the American exodus, negative coverage should not be hard for the administration to ride out, especially if it relies on the inac- curate but highly effective practice of blam- -146- |