Hayek's social theory does not end with the idea of a spontaneous
order. Hayek makes further far-reaching claims of a social theo-
retic nature which we must take seriously even if we reject that
idea as untenable. In this chapter, we shall examine his thesis that
some of the rules of just conduct, which form the institutional
basis of spontaneous economic order, are followed unconsciously.

Hayek thinks that wide areas of human activity are guided by
behavioural rules. We are able to orient ourselves in the world,
exercise skills, and interact with others, he says, because we ob-
serve rules. ¹ Yet it would in his view be a misunderstanding to
believe that thought, perception, skills, and social interaction are
all the result of the deliberate application of known rules. Human
conduct, he claims, is also based on unconscious, or tacit, rule-
following. Hayek thus talks of 'the uncontestable assumption that
we are not in fact able to specify all the rules which govern our
perceptions and actions' ( 1967: 60). Tacit rule-following, he ex-
plains, is conduct 'guided by rules (. . .) which the acting person
need not explicitly know (be able to specify, discursively to describe,
or "verbalize")' ( 1967: 45, footnote omitted). ² The claim, then,
appears to be that often we are not aware of, and are not in a
position expressly to state, the rules which actually direct our
behaviour.

Its sweeping generality makes it difficult to examine this claim.
In order to reach a reasonably definite verdict about its plausibility
one must distinguish between different spheres of human conduct.
While not entirely unconvincing with respect to sensory percep-
tion or to man's basic linguistic capacities, ³ the claim seems

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