WHAT were the thousand-odd brewers, to say nothing of over
150,000 wholesalers and retailers, to do with their plants and
equipment? Could they be converted to other products, or must
they be sold? In general the smaller brewers and the retailers
sold out, but most of the big shippers decided to try to keep
their plants in operation making whatever products they could.
In both cases, the transition was eased by the postwar boom
from 1919 to 1920 which produced soaring real-estate prices and
a sellers' market for nearly every commodity.

By the end of 1919, the Pabst Company was in excellent finan-
cial condition, and prepared for the worst. Cash on hand stood
at $634,000, readily marketable securities at $417,000, securities
having a specialized market at $1,213,000, net bills receivable
at $1,279,000, and inventory at about $1,000,000. Against these
ready assets of over $4,500,000, the company owed only $345,000
on current liabilities, and $1,246,000 in long-term bonds. Pablo
and Tonic sales had totaled over $550,000 in 1918, and brought
$127,000 in profits, so that the beginning of a future business
already existed.

But there was also a dark side to the picture. Pablo and the
Tonic made a profit because they were to a large extent carried
along by the production and selling costs of the beer. To make
these or other nonalcoholic beverages the main basis of the busi-
ness required the invasion of new markets already occupied
by well-established concerns and newly competed for by many
of the erstwhile brewers as well. Since the company might liqui-
date at no more than about a 20 per cent loss, there were grave
doubts in the minds of some of the stockholders regarding
whether the experiment should be risked. Neither Gustav
nor Fred Pabst, however, wanted to close the brewery. Both were
strongly sentimental in their attitude toward the old employees

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