Located along the border with West Timor, Bobonaro district consistently rated among the districts with the highest inci-
dences of political violence during the Unamet-run Popular Consultation. Elite members of the District Administration,
who stood to lose all if the autonomy option lost, and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), who would have to with-
draw from East Timor, pulled out all stops to improve the chances of an autonomy vote. A parallel track of coercion and vio-
lence was pursued through militia proxies to ensure the systematic control of the whole population while irreversibly
altering the political space in favor of the pro-autonomy cause. The TNI-militia relationship was anchored in strategies de-
vised as far back as 1994: home-grown East Timorese forces would bear the brunt of field and urban operations against
Falintil and pro-independence supporters. However, attempts to develop the militia into an institution in its own right, sep-
arate from the TNI, ultimately failed during Unamet's tenure. Over the different phases of the Consultation the militia
groups gradually fell apart. The East Timorese people and rank and file militia members passively rejected their instruc-
tions and ultimately many left the organization. By the time of the Consultation on 30 August 1999 the TNI and the Indone-
sian Police (Polri), including East Timorese in both units, became increasingly responsible for all violence and intimidation.
The precision and confidence with which they executed their strategies indicates coordination from the highest levels.

by Peter Bartu

Minister of Defence/Commander of the Armed Forces General
Wiranto has declared that the Indonesian Armed Forces is not a wild
band of men who can be put on trial by anyone. The army always
complies with official orders and always acts in conformity with the
laws in force and with human rights. "We have done the best we
could in keeping within the law, acting with discipline and basic hu-
man rights," he said.

Suara Pembaruan (The Voice of Renewal, Jakarta), 3 Oct. 1999

As a political officer with the United Nations Mission in East
Timor (Unamet) I reported on political developments in the vola-
tile western districts of East Timor (22 May-2 September), ini-
tially from Dili and then from Maliana, the capital of Bobonaro
District along the border with West Timor or Nusa Tenggara
Timur (NTT) province.

The situation in Bobonaro district was fluid and uncertain
for the entire period of the Popular Consultation ¹ during which
the beleaguered East Timorese could choose to accept or reject
the autonomy package offered by the Indonesian government.
The local authorities repeatedly made it clear that they had not
signed the May 5 Agreements and they offered begrudging co-
operation to Unamet. Elite members of the district administra-
tion (who stood to lose all if the autonomy option lost) and the In-
donesian armed forces (who would have to withdraw from East
Timor) pulled out all stops to improve the chances of an autonomy
vote. A parallel track of coercion and violence was pursued
through militia proxies. Over the different phases of the Unamet-
run Consultation the militia groups gradually fell apart. The East
Timorese people and rank and file militia members passively re-
jected their instructions and ultimately many left the organization.
By the time of the Consultation on 30 August 1999 the Indone-
sian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian Police
(Polri), including East Timorese in both units, became increas-
ingly responsible for all the violence and intimidation. The pre-
cision and confidence with which they executed their strategies
indicates coordination from the highest levels.

To conduct the Consultation Unamet divided East Timor into
eight regional centers based on population density and logistical
considerations. A political officer was assigned to each center
and worked alongside a Regional Electoral Coordinator (in
charge of technical aspects of the Consultation), a regional UN
Civilian Police chief (responsible for advising Polri on their se-
curity obligations under the Agreements), and a small team of
military liaison officers who maintained contact with the TNI.
Through July and August Unamet had up to sixty international
staff working in at least twenty-two separate locations through-
out Bobonaro district.

To assist with implementing the Agreements, the Polri,
TNI, and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (Deplu) each as-
signed English-speaking liaison officers to work alongside
Unamet and the predominantly East Timorese district adminis-
tration. Typically, Polri liaison officers had served on UN mis-
sions before, in countries such as Namibia, Cambodia, and
Bosnia. They worked alongside their local counterparts, many of
whom were intimately involved in the pro-integration cause.

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