WITH GEORGE WASHINGTON'S inauguration, the country con-
fronted immediately the vague language, competing grants of
authority, and outright gaps in the war-power provisions of the
Constitution. Despite them, answers were demanded to a
number of questions if the new government was to operate.
Might the Executive wage war on threatening Indians without
prior congressional approval? Which branch was to decide
whether the United States would recognize the revolutionary
French regime? Which was to construe the Franco-American
alliance and act on whether America would remain neutral in
the ongoing European conflict? How were our military and
diplomatic establishments to be created, organized, and ad-
ministered? And what was to be the relationship among the
President, Senate, and House in treaty making, in controlling
official channels of communication with other nations, and in
otherwise governing American diplomacy?

During succeeding years the country has continued to grapple
with the question of which branch has what war powers. At
times the issues have been new. Since the country lacked a
floating navy while Washington was in office, whether the
President might deploy warships on his own authority, and, if
so, exactly how far off our coasts he might send them—indeed,
whether he might risk naval combat in some circumstances—
had to await later administrations, most notably those of John