The primary CW allegation against the government of Afghanistan is of com-
plicity in allowing the USSR to stock and use CW agents against domestic
opponents. It is highly doubtful that Afghanistan has any assimilated capability
for offensive CW.

In the case of Afghanistan, as for Southeast Asia, a key distinction is that
between CW stocks controlled and perhaps used by the national government and
stocks controlled by the occupying or collaborating state. Variations in the press
survey ratings of Afghanistan may reflect confusion about control, beyond the
more basic question of the existence of CW munitions in the country. ¹ None
rated Afghanistan as a likely possessor. The two comprehensive surveys both
rate Afghanistan as "doubtful"; Julian Perry Robinson rated it in category III
out of four.

One must also distinguish between the standard lethal CW agents and (1)
toxins like those involved in the yellow rain allegations (as discussed in the
Vietnam review); (2) non-CW chemicals; and (3) incapacitants and riot-control
agents. This issue arises in connection with the allegations against the mujaheddin
as well as with those against the government.

Details given with some allegations or in follow-up reports point to misin-
formation or misidentification of other warfare chemicals. Such cases cast doubt
on others that make similar claims but lack detail. If one report claims nerve
gas use but names an herbicide as the agent, it casts doubt on less detailed reports
about nerve gas; if a case of burned flesh from an "unknown" agent turns out
to have been caused by napalm, similar cases must be treated with skepticism.

Identification of agents is further complicated in Afghanistan by the attribution

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