The Soviet sense of insecurity that bred the Cold War also provided
the constraints that kept it within bounds. The inside evidence of
Moscow's capabilities and intentions no longer leaves a doubt that its
leaders never wanted to overstep the limits. This is not to say that the
threat the West perceived was an empty one. In their quest for security,
Stalin and his successors were inclined to take greater risks whenever
they saw the correlation of forces turning in their favor. In estimating
their own strengths and the weaknesses of their adversaries, they were
prone to miscalculations. These were enhanced by their ideological
preconceptions, which postulated the ultimate victory of their system
despite temporary setbacks.

In the course of the forty-year contest, domestic considerations de-
termined Soviet international behavior far more than most contempo-
raries, misled by the Kremlin's not having to account for its action to
anyone, were prepared to believe. As long as Stalin was in charge, those
considerations were more general than specific—his need to maintain
his autocratic power and an economy that would sustain it. Only later
did they entail a clash of specific interests resulting in alternative poli-
cies articulated by different individuals or groups. During Stalin's life-
time, Soviet policy was for all intents and purposes his policy, on the
whole conforming to Khrushchev's description of the despot as some-
one behaving "like Almighty God with a host of angels and archangels.
He might listen to us, but the main thing was that he spoke and we
listened. He did not explain his reasoning, but passed down the word
to lesser mortals. They did what they were told when he wanted it
done." ¹ This was the time when the Soviet system came the closest to
the ideal model of totalitarian autocracy; in the real world, however,
the autocrat's control was less than total, his policy often inconsistent,
and its results not always commensurate with expectations.

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