There is a story, probably apocryphal, that Ben-Gurion decided to examine
the economic feasibility of his vision to transform the Negev into a luxuri-
ant garden region. Because the Negev was empty and constituted about half
the area of the state, Ben-Gurion believed it had to absorb many of the new
immigrants. "Conquest of the desert" thus became a central policy goal in
Ben-Gurion's concept of the Zionist enterprise. He and his family moved
from Tel Aviv to Sde Boker, a kibbutz in the northern part of the Negev, to
provide a personal example. To assess the cost and identify the means by
which to realize his vision, Ben-Gurion assembled a committee of experts
who studied the issue. The experts recommended against pursuit of this far-
reaching goal, but Ben-Gurion refused to accept their advice. He assembled
another committee, which arrived at similar conclusions. A third commis-
sion was formed--this one made up of international scientists--and again
the answer was negative. Ben-Gurion nonetheless continued to pursue the
vision and to emphasize the centrality of the desert in the development of
the new state.

The story illustrates the determination of some Israeli policymakers to over-
come obstacles in spite of unfavorable odds and, in this case, against the
recommendations of scientists. When all rational methods used to arrive at
a decision had failed, imaginative decisions were taken based on vision, in-
tuition, experience, emotions, and faith. For Ben-Gurion and some of his
successors, extra-rational decisions that had unexpected outcomes became

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