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This book analyzes why the Rehnquist Court never fulfilled expectations for the reversal of liberal judicial decisions from the Warren and Burger Courts. At its conservative high point in 1991-1992 the Supreme Court was dominated by seven justices who had dependably conservative voting records over ...

This book analyzes why the Rehnquist Court never fulfilled expectations for the reversal of liberal judicial decisions from the Warren and Burger Courts. At its conservative high point in 1991-1992 the Supreme Court was dominated by seven justices who had dependably conservative voting records over the course of their early careers. Five of these justices were appointed in the 1980s and early 1990s by Reagan and Bush, presidents who made concerted efforts to appoint judicial officers who would undo liberal precedents. This is the first book to focus on scholars' growing recognition that the Rehnquist Court has not been as conservative as most presumed it would be. In focusing on Justice Antonin Scalia, whose role inadvertently contributed to the Court's failure to achieve conservative goals, the study examines how individual justices can affect Supreme Court decisions through their judicial behavior.

We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim--"distinguishing one prior case on ...

We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim--"distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal--good law." But is this common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative.In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the "strict constructionism" that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly "smuggle" in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals.This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia's ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints.

This is an inside look at the principal decision makers and the major legal and constitutional decisions made in the Department of Justice under Attorney General Edwin Meese. Kmiec, former assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), offers a fascinating chronicle and ...

This is an inside look at the principal decision makers and the major legal and constitutional decisions made in the Department of Justice under Attorney General Edwin Meese. Kmiec, former assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), offers a fascinating chronicle and analysis of the significant issues addressed during and since the Reagan years. These include the controversy over methods of constitutional interpretation; the legitimacy of independent counsels; efforts by the president to control executive agencies and to keep Congress in check; family issues, including abortion, AIDS, limitations on pornography, and school choice; quotas, affirmative action, and civil rights; the Iran-Contra affair; and more.

The Habits of Legality provides a broad survey of American criminal justice in a time of troubles. It asks the central questions: In what degree are the justice system's functions guided by ascertainable legal norms? How accountable are public officials who wield the rigorous sanctions of the penal ...

The Habits of Legality provides a broad survey of American criminal justice in a time of troubles. It asks the central questions: In what degree are the justice system's functions guided by ascertainable legal norms? How accountable are public officials who wield the rigorous sanctions of the penal law? Where the habits of legality are weak, how can they be invigorated? A number of factors combine to constrict the rule of law in the criminal process. A crime epidemic of alarming proportions places enormous burdens on the system and gives rise to a "war on crime" that often oversteps the limits of legality. The institutional structure of the United States is severely fragmented, rendering coherent penal policy difficult or impossible and often freeing public officials of accountability for their uses of public authority. Even the courts and legislatures, the primary law-making agencies of society, often operate to weaken rather than strengthen the rule of law. Francis A. Allen asserts the vital and continuing importance of the legality principle to democratic societies, discusses how the habits of legality in American criminal justice can be strengthened, and demonstrates that a closer adherence to the rule of law may not only protect the rights of persons more efficiently, but also contribute to more rational and effective penal policy. The Habits of Legality offers solutions on how to revitalize the rule of law. It will be of interest to scholars and students of criminology and law, as well as the general reader concerned with issues of criminal justice.

At the century's end, societies all over the world are moving from authoritarian rule to democracy. At any such time of radical change, the question arises: should a society punish its ancien regime or let bygones by bygones? Transitional Justice takes the debate to a new level with an ...

At the century's end, societies all over the world are moving from authoritarian rule to democracy. At any such time of radical change, the question arises: should a society punish its ancien regime or let bygones by bygones? Transitional Justice takes the debate to a new level with an interdisciplinary approach that challenges the very terms of the contemporary debate. Teitel explores the recurring question of how regimes should respond to evil rule, arguing against the prevailing view favoring punishment, and contending through historical and comparative illustrations that the law nevertheless plays a profound role in periods of radical change. She proposes a new normative conception of justice--one that is highly politicized--offering glimmerings of the rule of law that, in her view, have become symbols of liberal transition.